The Court After Scalia by Walsh, Kevin C.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
10-2016
The Court After Scalia
Kevin C. Walsh
University of Richmond, kwalsh@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Courts Commons
This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin C. Walsh, The Court After Scalia, 266 First Things 45 (2016).
IRST THINGS October 2016
THE COURT 
AFTER SCALIA
Kevin c. Walsh surveys the 2015-2016 Supreme Court term.
he term’s defining event was 
the February death of Justice 
Antonin Scalia. Everyone 
wonders how his successor will affect the future of the Supreme Court. 
Very soon after his demise, political controversy erupted when Senate 
Republicans announced that no nominee to replace Scalia would be 
considered until after the 2016 election. Given that three more seats are 
likely to become vacant over the next two presidential terms, we have 
every reason to think that the present high-stakes maneuvering around 
Supreme Court appointments will only intensify..
Instead of speaking of .the Court’s new trajectory, it makes more 
sense to think of the current Court in a holding pattern. All things
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entirety, "the mansion of constitutionalized abortion 
law, constructed overnight in Roe ًامه. Wade, must be 
disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb,” as Justice 
Scalia once wrote. Whole Woman) Health did not 
dismantle any part of the mansion, but neither did 
it place the mansion on firmer foundations. Now, 
as before, our constitutional law of abortion rests 
entirely on the shoulders of the five in the Whole 
Womaris Health majority. And three are approach- 
ing the end of their time on the bench. Justice Breyer 
is seventy-eight؛ Justice Kennedy eighty؛ and Justice 
Ginsburg eighty-three. In the not-too-distant future, 
we should expect desperation to set in on the other 
side as abortion proponents eye actuarial tables. The 
Roe defenders are aging, not just on the Court, but 
in the wider society as well؛ younger generations are 
less supportive of abortion rights than when Roe was 
decided. As long as the five whole Womaris Health 
justices remain on the bench, though, there is little 
hope for progress in undoing the Court’s abortion 
extremism. And that means there is little upside right 
now in adding another abortion-law dissenter.
ustice Scalia’s death also made no difference 
in the outcome of the affirmative action case 
Fisher ًامه. University of Texas. This was a 
4-3 decision in which Justice Kennedy voted 
with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, while 
Roberts, Thomas, and Alito dissented. (Kagan was 
recused because of earlier involvement with the case 
as a government lawyer.) The case was on its second 
trip to the Supreme Court, leading Court watchers 
to refer to it as Fisher II. A few years earlier, the 
Court seemed poised to hold unconstitutional the 
University of Texas’s racial preference system. But 
after several months of post-argument gestation, 
the opinion in Fisher I sent the case back down to 
the appellate court for further consideration of the 
details of the university’s admissions policies under a 
more demanding standard of review.
In Fisher /7, the Court surprised many by 
upholding race-based affirmative action, with Jus- 
tice Kennedy writing the opinion for the Court. 
Justice Kennedy’s vote to approve racial preferences 
marked a turnabout from a track record of more 
than twenty-five years. What happened to the jus- 
tice who wrote in 1989 that “the moral imperative 
of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal 
Protection Clause”? Or the Justice Kennedy who 
blasted his colleagues’ upholding of race-based af- 
firmative action in the university law school setting 
in 2003, writing that “preferment by race, when 
resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive 
of all policies, containing within it the potential to
considered, this might not be so bad. We may regret 
some of the present Court’s decisions. The last term 
featured missed opportunities to get federal law mov- 
ing in better directions. But given the current state 
of our constitutional politics, treading water could 
be as good as it gets, at least for a while. Those of 
us who care about cultivating a higher quotient of 
legal integrity and intellectual honesty in our con- 
stitutionalism ought to entertain a perhaps heretical 
thought: No new justices for a spell might be better 
than adding anyone who could make it through our 
rotten confirmation process.
e begin with three big cases in 
which Justice Scalia’s absence 
made no difference to the out- 
come. The first was an abortion 
case. Whole Womaris Health ًامه. 
Hellerstedt. By a 3-3 vote, the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a Texas law that required abortion 
facilities to meet the high standards of ambulatory 
surgical centers and to have on staff a doctor with 
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Justice 
Breyer authored the opinion, but Justice Kennedy 
supplied the deciding vote. And he would have done 
that whether or not Justice Scalia had been there.
In the Texas legislation at issue in Whole Womaris 
Health, pro-lifers had deployed a classic progressive 
approach to deterring socially undesirable activity: 
adding regulatory burdens. It is an irony that today’s 
“progressives” cheer the judicial defeat of this tactic. 
Using the due process clause to accomplish deregula- 
tion through litigation is exactly what their Progressive 
forebears railed against in the early twentieth century.
Proponents of using the Constitution to destroy 
legal protections for unborn human life have hailed 
Whole Womaris Health as the most important abor- 
tion rights case in more than two decades. This is an 
overstatement, to say the least. The decision was very 
fact-specific. At issue was how to apply the “undue 
burden” standard from the Court’s 1992 decision in 
Planned Parenthood ًامه. Casey, under which abortion- 
related laws are unconstitutional if they have the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of women seeking abortion. Justice Breyer’s 
opinion for the Court (joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan) focused on the effects of the 
Texas rules and concluded that the medical benefits 
were insufficient to justify the burdens. This decision 
does little to alter the constitutional law of abortion 
because the effects of other state abortion laws may 
differ, and the undue burden standard is mushy.
As long as the Court maintains the course charted 
in Casey and refuses to overturn Roe ًامه. Wade in its
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the encounter, and the subsequently discovered illegal 
drugs could be used as evidence against Strieff.
Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor wrote dis- 
sents, which Justice Ginsburg joined. Kagan’s dissent 
once again reveals her mastery of the genre, which 
can be admired even by those who disagree with her 
vote. More notable, however, was a portion of Jus- 
tice Sotomayor’s dissent that even Justice Ginsburg 
refused to join. “Writing only for myself, and draw- 
ing on my professional experiences,” Sotomayor 
wrote, “I would add that unlawful ‘stops’ have some 
consequences much greater than the inconvenience 
suggested by the name.” Although Strieff is white, 
“it is no secret that people of color are dispropor- 
tionate victims of this type of scrutiny.” Sotomayor 
then charged that the Court’s decision “implies that 
you are not a citizen of a democracy, but the subject 
of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.” She 
alluded to critical race theorists and the Black Lives 
Matter movement. Those routinely targeted by police 
“are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil 
and literal, warn US that no one can breathe in this 
atmosphere,” and “until their voices matter, too, our 
justice system will continue to be anything but.”
o his credit. Justice Clarence Thomas did 
not take the bait but declined to respond 
in the opinion for the Court that he 
authored. An in-kind rebuttal would have 
served no purpose proper to the Supreme 
Court’s exposition of the law. Justice Sotomayor’s 
legally gratuitous—and gratuitously explicit—invo- 
cation of the distinctive language of a social reform 
movement is highly unusual for a judicial opinion. 
As it should be. More about signaling than suasion, 
such language says “I’m on your side”—to some, 
anyway. Sotomayor’s stance is perfectly acceptable 
for an activist, but not for a judge, who must strive 
for impartiality. A judge should be above the fray and 
under the law؛ she should not exaggerate to induce 
outrage in her audience. And one wonders: If the posi- 
tion adopted by the Court majority about the exclu- 
sionary rule truly implied the grave racial injustices 
announced by Justice Sotomayor in the solo portion 
of her dissent, why did the Obama administration 
argue as a friend of the court on Utah’s side in Strieff  ?
When judges make emotional appeals to personal 
experience in their opinions, they also invite parties 
to make emotional appeals to personal experience 
in their arguments to the judges. Just this past term. 
Whole Womans Health featured no fewer than three 
amicus briefs built around personal abortion nar- 
ratives gathered from more than one hundred legal 
professionals, four Texas legislators, and several
destroy confidence in the Constitution and in the 
idea of equality”?
The primary criticism Justice Kennedy leveled 
against his affirmative action-approving colleagues 
in that earlier case—that they refused “to apply 
meaningful strict scrutiny”—applies with equal or 
greater force to his opinion in Fisher II. A dissent 
from Justice Scalia in Fisher II could have blown 
Justice Kennedy’s rationale to pieces with Kennedy’s 
own words from more than twenty-five years of opin- 
ions criticizing government deployment of racial clas- 
sifications. But ifjustice Scalia had been on the Court 
for the decision of Fisher II, there almost certainly 
would have been the same result, although without 
any opinions. Justice Kagan’s recusal would have left 
the Court at eight justices, and the 4-4 division fol- 
lowing from Justice Kennedy’s course-reversal would 
have resulted in affirmance of the lower court deci- 
sion allowing the university’s affirmative action pro- 
gram to stand.
While Fisher II was a surprise given the content of 
Kennedy’s opinions on racial classifications through- 
out his judicial career, maybe it should not have been. 
According to Joan Biskupic’s reporting on the Court’s 
internal deliberations the first time around in Fisher 
I, Justice Kennedy had initially drafted an opinion 
holding the university’s admissions practices uncon- 
stitutional. But he retreated in the face of an impas- 
sioned, highly personal draft dissent about the role 
of race by Justice Sotomayor.
lthough Sotomayor’s emotional appeal 
was successful in Fisher I and Fisher II, 
a similar tactic had no effect this year 
in Utah V. Strieff By a 5-3 vote, with 
Justice Breyer leaving his normal vot- 
ing bloc to vote with Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Alito, the Court expanded an exception to the 
exclusionary rule known as the attenuation doctrine. 
The basic thrust of the exclusionary rule is that in 
criminal prosecutions, the government cannot use 
evidence that is illegally obtained. But this rule has 
exceptions. One is attenuation, which applies when 
the unlawful act by law enforcement is sufficiently 
remote from the finding of the evidence to diminish 
(attenuate) the unlawful act’s significance.
In the case before the justices, the police had 
stopped Edward Strieff in circumstances assumed by 
the Court to be unconstitutional. But after uncover- 
ing an outstanding warrant for his arrest during the 
stop, the officer arrested him on that warrant, and 
then discovered illegal drugs in a routine search that 
accompanied the arrest. The Court held that the dis- 
covery of the arrest warrant changed the nature of
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briefing procedure helped illustrate the government’s 
unnecessary aggressiveness as litigation has dragged 
out for more than three years. The administration’s 
supplemental briefing confirmed what has been 
obvious all along, which is that government hijack- 
ing of religious employers’ employee benefit plans is 
unnecessary to accomplish what would be at most 
marginal advancement of the supposed government 
interest in easier access to contraception.
nother case in which the administration 
got off easier than it likely would have if 
Justice Scalia had been on the bench was 
United States ًامه. Texas, which concerned 
executive power and illegal immigration. 
It ended in a 4-4 tie. Several states had brought suit 
against the Obama administration’s policy of halting 
the deportation of certain classes of people who are 
in the United States illegally. The claim was that the 
administration did not have the authority to suspend 
the enforcement of existing laws. Lower courts found 
against the administration. Although these lower 
court decisions were made on fairly narrow, admin- 
istrative law grounds, they prevented implementation 
of the administration’s policies.
When the Supreme Court took the case, it 
expanded the issues for review, adding the con- 
stitutional separation of powers into the mix. Did 
the administration’s policies of declining to enforce 
existing law amount, in effect, to a change in the law 
of the sort that only Congress can undertake? Were 
these policies inconsistent with the president’s consti- 
tutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed? There was also a serious question whether 
the states had legal standing to bring their case for- 
ward in the first instance.
Given the configuration of issues, it is hard to 
know for sure how the case would have been decided 
by the Court had Justice Scalia been alive. Some 
of the justices sympathetic to arguments that the 
Obama administration overstepped constitutional 
limits may have decided the states lacked legal stand- 
ing to file suit in the first place. Or, in order to stitch 
together a majority., the decision might have turned 
on the administrative law grounds relied upon by the 
lower courts.
My best guess is that the Obama administration 
dodged a constitutional bullet. There’s already a 
great deal of boundary-pushing lawmaking going 
on in the executive branch. A constitutional rebuke 
by the Supreme Court in this case would have indi- 
cated that the justices are willing to consider other 
challenges. Meanwhile, the states probably lost an 
opportunity to secure a ruling on state standing that
minors. The allure of emotivism explains much of 
the rise of emotional appeals in our culture gener- 
ally. But in legal cases before the Supreme Court 
there is a special incentive. Justice Kennedy, often 
the swing vote in crucial cases, has shown himself 
susceptible to the sway of sentiment. This admitted- 
ly does not always send him in the same direction, 
which is unsurprising given the unprincipled nature 
of arguments based on personal experience. In his 
opinion upholding the federal partial-birth abortion 
law some years back. Justice Kennedy relied upon a 
friend-of-the-court brief containing personal testi- 
monies about post-abortion regret. But by and large, 
appeals to personal experience send him further to 
the left (and higher into the atmosphere). Last year’s 
same-sex marriage case, Obergefell ًامه. Hodges, pro- 
vides a vivid example.
or readers of this journal, the most salient 
case where Scalia’s absence was decisive is 
Zubik ًامه. Burwell. More commonly known 
as the Little Sisters of the Poor case, it was 
in fact a collection of cases consolidated for 
briefing, argument, and decision because they all 
involved the same issue: Does a federal statute known 
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
prohibit the federal government from imposing severe 
financial penalties on religious nonprofits who do not 
provide coverage in connection with their employee 
benefit plans for the full range of FDA-approved con- 
traceptive drugs and devices?
With Justice Scalia’s death just over a month before 
oral argument, the Little Sisters of the Poor case went 
from a likely 5-4 decision favoring religious freedom 
to an 8-0 decision with a practical meaning still to be 
worked out. After oral argument, the Court issued an 
unusual supplemental briefing order asking the par- 
ties to address the possibility of a compromise. Then, 
upon considering the new material submitted to the 
Court, the justices said that the parties’ supplemental 
briefs indicated some shifts from where the parties 
had started. This, in turn, led them to send the case 
back down to the lower courts for reconsideration. In 
essence, the Court’s ruling erased lower court losses 
for the religious nonprofits while explicitly asserting 
that its decision set no precedent for the application 
of RFRA.
In the meantime, the federal government and 
religious nonprofits mull possible solutions while 
the cases stay on ice in the courts. As counsel for 
the Little Sisters of the Poor, I view this Supreme 
Court outcome as better than what otherwise could 
have been a 4-4 split leaving in place the bad de- 
cisions of the lower courts. And the supplemental
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other reasons without customer inconvenience. But 
on appeal, the Ninth Circuit erased that win, hold- 
ing that the pharmacists had no constitutional right 
to exemption from the regulations. This case tested 
the limits of free exercise jurisprudence because what 
looked on its face to be a set of neutral and generally 
applicable pharmacy regulations had in fact been de- 
signed to go after conscience-based objections.
The petitioners in Stormans came up just one vote 
short in seeking review, a vote Justice Scalia almost 
certainly would have supplied. The order denying 
review was accompanied by a notable dissent written 
by Alito, and joined by Roberts and Thomas. Alito’s 
dissent highlights the dangers posed by the Ninth Cir- 
cuit decision: "If this is a sign of how religious liberty 
claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who 
value religious freedom have cause for great concern.”
ith the important religious free- 
dom case of Trinity Lutheran 
Church V. Pauley set to be decided 
in the upcoming term, these are 
discomforting words. Trinity 
Lutheran applied for a scrap rubber grant from Mis- 
souri to make its nursery school playground safer. 
The church met the criteria for the state-run scrap 
rubber grant program (yes, there is such a thing). But 
Missouri is one of more than thirty states with con- 
stitutional amendments prohibiting any aid to reli- 
gious institutions, including some adopted largely for 
anti-Catholic reasons during the late nineteenth cen- 
tury. Thus, Trinity Lutheran’s application for a grant 
to subsidize the installation of shredded car tires in 
its playground was rejected. Legal challenge to that 
denial has thus far failed.
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court has held 
that when it comes to government benefits and bur- 
dens, states must be neutral toward religion. But 
in Locke V. Davey (2004), the Supreme Court said 
there was some "play in the joints.” A concern to 
prevent the establishment of religion could some- 
times justify the exclusion of religious believers or in- 
stitutions from certain government benefits without 
running afoul of the First Amendment’s protections. 
The Trinity Lutheran case probes the boundaries of 
this "play in the joints” concept, which lower courts 
have understood in varying ways. At issue is the 
extent to which states can disfavor religion without 
running afoul of the neutrality requirement of the 
free exercise clause.
Before Justice Scalia’s death, the prospects for Trin- 
ity Lutheran in this case looked more promising than 
they do now. Scalia was a dissenter in Locke V. Davey 
and, in this case, would likely have sought to construe
would have put them on firmer ground for future 
challenges to federal regulation. Each of these pos- 
sible rulings would have been very significant for the 
longer term. For the short term, though, the evenly 
split vote maintains the lower court rulings, and the 
administration cannot go forward with its policies.
The last big 4-4 decision to consider, Friedrichs V. 
California Teacher Association, was a First Amend- 
ment challenge to compulsory union dues for mem- 
bers of public-sector labor unions. At issue were 
so-called “fair share” fees to cover costs of collective 
bargaining, which had to be paid even by employ- 
ees who objected to the union’s advocacy. A new 
teacher, for example, would have to pay his “fair 
share” fee even if the teachers’ union argues for a 
“last in, first out” policy for eliminating positions. 
Although the compulsion to subsidize objectionable 
speech presents an obvious First Amendment prob- 
lem, an earlier Supreme Court decision green-lighted 
such dues by saying the speech burdens were justi- 
fied by the benefits of public-sector labor unions. In 
recent cases, a five-justice majority, always includ- 
ing Scalia, had raised very grave doubts about this 
precedent without overturning it. This time they 
appeared ready to do so. But Scalia’s death scuttled 
that outcome.
The other 4-4 cases were Hawkins V. Community 
Bank of Raymore and Dollar General Corporation 
υ. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. Hawkins 
was about the legality of a federal regulation pro- 
hibiting lenders from requiring loan guarantees from 
the spouses of loan applicants. Dollar General was 
about the jurisdiction of tribal courts to decide civil 
tort claims against nonmembers. The Republic will 
endure without immediate Supreme Court resolution 
of these issues.
ustices also vote on whether or not to allow 
cases to come before the Court for final review. 
Here Scalia’s absence was painfully apparent 
when, after his death, the Court decided not to 
consider Stormans, Inc. V. Wiesman. A family 
pharmacy—Ralph’s Thriftway—and two individual 
pharmacists sought protection from regulations that 
require them to provide Plan B and other “emer- 
gency contraceptives” believed to have an abortion- 
inducing effect on a fertilized ovum. These petitioners 
sought the freedom to refer customers to other phar- 
macies or pharmacists. They won in the trial court, 
showing that the drugs are stocked by thirty other 
pharmacies within five miles of Ralph’s, that none 
of Ralph’s customers has ever been denied timely ac- 
cess to emergency contraceptives, and that pharma- 
cists often refer customers to other pharmacists for
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an even number of them. There is no equivalent of a 
“courtesy fifth” when it comes to deciding cases and 
joining opinions, to be sure, but there are many tools 
for principled compromise available to the justices.
hen we heard of Justice Scalia’s 
unexpected death, we all knew its 
import for the future of our legal 
system. Liberals and conserva- 
tives alike recognized that with- 
out his presence, the Supreme Court’s trajectory 
will change, especially if he is replaced by someone 
nominated by a Democratic administration. As we 
wait to see who survives the increasingly rancor- 
ous politics of judicial appointment, nobody really 
knows what this coming term will bring. I expect, 
though, that the eight-justice Supreme Court will 
operate well enough.
An eight-justice Court makes it harder to push 
through consequential rulings with narrow majori- 
ties. That’s not so bad. As others have argued, less 
ambition for broad rulings, lower stakes, and the 
need for compromise in closely divided cases can be 
good for our law and for the Court. Sure, there may 
be some 4-4 decisions that frustrate US. But if this 
term is any indication, these split decisions will not be 
momentous in what they do to the law. If anything, 
an eight-justice Court and the possibility of split deci- 
sions that maintain the status quo could bring more 
stability to our law.
And we may be stuck with an eight-justice Court 
for a while because of the fraught politics that now 
attend Senate confirmation of Supreme Court nomi- 
nees. On this subject. Justice Scalia has proven pro- 
phetic. On a number of occasions, he drew a direct 
connection between the Court’s living constitutional- 
ism—dependent as it is on perceived shifts in public 
opinion—and the deterioration of the confirmation 
process. “I hate to think what the next Supreme 
Court nomination hearings are going to be like,” he 
said in 2003, “because what both sides are looking 
for are judges who agree with them as to what the 
new Constitution that they create ought to be. It’s a 
very sad ending to the game.”
Justice Scalia was far-seeing in other ways as 
well. Some of his signature opinions were dissenting 
jeremiads: lamentations about the state of the law, 
prophecies of decline due to unfaithfulness, and calls 
for renewal and turning back. But we have lost our 
judicial Jeremiah, and there is no replacing him.
Perhaps we should make a virtue of necessity, and 
just not try. Given that our next president will be 
Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton, an extended halt 
on Supreme Court confirmations may be the best
exception from the neutrality requirement narrowly. 
But perhaps even without Scalia the Court will rule 
in favor of Trinity Lutheran’s nursery school and the 
kids who use its playground. Any such decision would 
probably be very narrow, however, as it will likely 
depend on obtaining the vote of Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, or Kagan. These four justices have tended 
to vote as a bloc in religious freedom cases.
n addition to voting on whether or not to hear 
cases, the justices vote on whether or not to 
issue stays. As the name suggests, a “stay” is an 
order that prevents something from happening 
while the matter is being adjudicated. The Stan- 
dards for obtaining a stay from the Supreme Court 
are stringent, and while a stay is not a ruling on the 
merits, at least five justices typically must agree that 
the case is likely to be decided in favor of the party 
seeking the stay.
One important grant of a stay application, decided 
3-4 just a few days before Justice Scalia died, stopped 
the implementation of the Obama administration’s 
Clean Power Plan while legal challenges to it remain 
under review in the D.c. Circuit. This stay protects 
utilities and others from having to invest hundreds 
of millions of dollars to begin complying with the 
regulations they are challenging in court. The 3-4 
split among the justices tracked an ideological split 
we often saw on the Court in recent years.
Another important stay, decided 3-3, concerned a 
lower court ruling requiring the Gloucester County 
(Virginia) School Board to allow a biological female 
with a male gender identity to use the high school’s 
male restrooms during the upcoming school year. 
The decisive vote on this application was Justice 
Breyer’s. He provided what is known as a “courtesy 
fifth.” It takes only four votes for the Supreme Court 
to decide to review a case, but five votes to grant a 
stay. So, as a courtesy to the four justices likely to 
vote in favor of hearing the case (Roberts, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito), Breyer supplied a fifth vote on 
the stay. This stay means the school board will not 
have to change its restroom policy heading into the 
new school year while the Supreme Court decides 
whether or not to take its case.
Breyer would probably not have joined with 
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in this stay 
grant on a nine-justice Court that also included 
Scalia. But expect to see more of this kind of thing 
in the coming term. The Court must adjust to its 
circumstances, and the justices will entertain trade- 
offs that can break a potentially embarrassing 4-4 
deadlock. The voting on this stay application gives 
us a clue about how the justices may operate with
50
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be permitted to claim a mandate to shape the future 
of the judicial branch. Inaction might be a fruitful 
way of using inertia to accomplish a reform agenda 
for the Court.
Going down to seven seats would take care of the 
Scalia vacancy. And the next vacancy would vanish 
as soon as it appears. There would be no problem of 
tie votes (to the extent that is a problem), and seven 
justices have the capacity to do the work currently 
done by nine. By historical standards, the number of 
decisions is at a record low and support staff is at 
an all-time high. The justices also pretty much take 
the whole summer off. Practicalities aside, one can 
hope that congressional action to impose a “cool- 
ing off” period on appointments to the Supreme 
Court would promote judicial introspection. And 
that, in turn, might lead the justices to cut back on 
finger-to-the-wind adjudication that discredits our 
legal system and contributes to our dysfunctional 
confirmation process. H
course of action. If nothing else, it could serve as a 
wake-up call to the justices on the Court to appreci- 
ate the political consequences of their legal formless- 
ness on issues important to the American people.
Even better: Congress should move to reduce the 
size of the Supreme Court to seven. The Constitution 
leaves the number of seats on the Supreme Court up 
to Congress, which first set the size of the court at six. 
Our country went for almost fifty years before there 
were nine seats on the Court. For a short period. 
Congress moved the size up to ten, then back down 
to seven, before settling at nine in 1869.
It’s unlikely that any president would sign legisla- 
tion decreasing the size of the Supreme Court on his 
or her watch. But as a practical matter, simple refusal 
by the Senate to act could accomplish the same thing. 
Some might condemn this as obstruction. But in the 
wake of a presidential election like this year’s, in 
which the main virtue of a vote for either candidate 
is that it is not a vote for the other one, nobody should
The Ten Suggestions
When Moses came down from the mountain and cloud
bearing the Ten Commandments in hand
and saw the calf adored by the crowd
and smashed the tablets of God’s command
one of the Hebrews quick-witted and proud
bent and wrote the Ten down in the sand.
—/٠ A. Gray
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